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Law for the Elephant. By John phillip Reid.
San Marino, California: The Huntington
Library, 1980. Illustration, index. x + 437
pp. $18.50.
Most Americans in the mid-nineteenth century lived within a society of laws. There are
at least two opposed views with respect to what
American attitudes and actions were like outside of such a lawful society. On the one hand,
some historians have speculated that frontier
life was lawless and violent. Might entailed
right, according to this view. On the other
hand, others have suggested that frontier life
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was natural and good. Americans, freed of the
restraints oflaw, intuitively acted justly.
John Phillip Reid here examines countless
diaries and letters of American emigrants on
the Overland Trail at mid-century. In particular,
he examines their attitudes about property
and how these attitudes influenced their
behavior. He concludes that emigrants on the
Overland Trail were neither peculiarly violent
nor unusually just. Instead, they were universally lawful. They understood complex
concepts of property, and these concepts
influenced their behavior. Reid suggests that
their understanding of legal ownership and its
prerogatives (sometimes exaggerated) was the
most important element in influencing their
actions with respect to personal property on
the trail.
Property law, as understood on the trail,
was not simplistic. Persons understood the concept of ownership as distinct from mere possession. There was no doubt, for example,
that an owner who had lost his property had a
legal right to reclaim it. There was no rule of
finders-keepers. At most, Reid concludes, a
finder could assert a claim for a finder's fee.
The abstract rights of ownership were so potent
on the trail that an owner could even reclaim
his property from a possessor who had purchased the property in good faith. Although
Reid does not address the issue, this might
have been an exaggeration of the owner's
prerogatives. In several eastern states, the law
at that time was beginning to protect some
good faith purchasers.
Not only did trail emigrants have no trouble
understanding abstract concepts of ownership,
they were also conversant with several forms of
concurrent ownership. Much property was
owned in partnership. This frequently caused
divisiveness when equal owners wanted to do
different things with the property (e.g., go back
home, speed up the journey, abandon the
property). Although there were a number of
solutions to these problems, all began with the
unalterable premise that each owner had a
legal claim to some portion of the property.
Co-ownership also caused problems when a

particular resource grew scarce. The emigrants
normally solved these problems by converting the jointly owned property to privately
owned property. Thus, if sugar became scarce,
and some owners were using more than their
fair share, the emigrants would normally
designate each person a private owner of
a portion of the sugar. Each could then use
his or her sugar at any rate he or she chose.
Some may perceive such a solution as an
exaggerated reliance on private property
concepts.
The most prominent aspect of property
ownership was that it gave exclusive rights to
an owner to do whatever he chose with his
property. Rarely did anyone claim, as a matter
of legal rights, an interest in someone else's
property. Even in the most difficult circumstances, neither force nor necessity entailed
legal right. An owner could sell his property,
even food or water, for as much as he could
get, even though the owner might have a surplus and the buyer was in dire need. The
owner could even destroy it. Emigrants might
criticize an owner's morality, but no one questioned his legal right.
Emigrants sometimes exaggerated the legal
rights of owners. Reid recounts an example
in which an owner lent a team and wagon to a
family for the trip. One of the family members
became sick and had to ride. The owner, fearing that his team now had too much to pull,
repossessed his property. The family was left
on the trail. In the eastern states, the family
might have had a legal claim, based either on
equitable or contractual principles, to the team
and wagon. On the trail, ownership was supreme. Emigrants believed the owner's act
was morally wrong; most believed, however,
that he was within his legal rights.

Law for the Elephant is a convincing study
of the importance of law, particularly property
concepts, on the trail. It is a remarkable contribution to American legal history.
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